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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether petitioner can raise issues in a pet i t ion 
for a writ of habeas corpus, Rule 65B(i) when petitioner has 
fa i led to f i l e a direct appeal from the tr ia l court's denial of 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Whether the Distr ict Court properly denied 
Pet i t ioner's petit ion for habeas corpus re l i e f? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ABE LEVI WELLS, t 
Pet i t ioner-Appel lant , : Case No. 20453 
- v - : 
KENNETH V. SHULSEN, : Pr ior i ty No. 2 
Warden, Utah State Prison, 
Department of Adult : 
Probation and Parole , 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENlLSr THE CASD 
P e t i t i o n e e Abe Levi Wells f was charged with obtaining 
a prescr ipt ion under f a l s e pretense r a third degree fe lony, in 
v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 ( 4 ) ( A ) ( i i ) (Supp. 1983). 
Pet i t ioner was convicted upon a plea of g u i l t y to the 
charged crimes on December 1 , 1983, in the Second Judic ia l 
D i s t r i c t Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Duffy Palmer, pres iding. On December 22 pe t i t ioner 
made a motion t o withdraw his gu i l ty p lea . Such motion was 
denied on January 12, 1984. Pe t i t ioner was sentenced on February 
9 , 1984 to zero to f i v e years in the s t a t e peni tent iary . 
Pe t i t ioner neglected t o f i l e an appeal from his g u i l t y plea but 
instead waited almost one year then sought a writ of habeas 
corpus on December 18, 19 84 in the Third Jud ic ia l D i s t r i c t in and 
for Sa l t Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, pres iding. Pet i t ioner claimed his g u i l t y plea was 
invo luntar i ly and unintent ional ly entered due to the influence of 
drugs a t the time he plead g u i l t y . Judge Russon denied the writ 
of habeas corpus. Pet i t ioner now appeals t o t h i s court . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 1 , 1983, pe t i t i oner was arraigned before 
the Honorable Duffy Palmer, Second Jud ic ia l D i s t r i c t Court in and 
for Davis County, Utah on the charge of obtaining a prescr ipt ion 
under f a l s e pretenses . Pe t i t i oner appeared with h i s counsel , 
Scott W. Holt. A copy of the Information was del ivered t o 
p e t i t i o n e r , and read aloud by the court clerk (R. 94 ) . 
Pe t i t ioner was asked i f he understood the information t o which 
pe t i t i oner repl ied "yes, s ir" (R. 94-95) . The State then agreed 
t o dismiss count two based upon p e t i t i o n e r ' s g u i l t y plea to count 
one (R. 95) . The State further agreed that i f a t the time of 
sentencing the p e t i t i o n e r had no previous record of obtaining 
prescr ip t ions or contro l led substances that the State would 
concur in a 402 motion a t that time (R. 9 5 ) . Pe t i t ioner then 
entered a g u i l t y plea (R. 96) . 
Judge Palmer then asked p e t i t i o n e r i f he was pleading 
g u i l t y because he was in fact g u i l t y of the o f fense , t o which 
p e t i t i o n e r said "yes" (R. 9 6 ) . The Judge further asked 
p e t i t i o n e r i f he understood the offense had a penalty, and 
further that by pleading g u i l t y p e t i t i o n e r would not have a jury 
t r i a l nor bring wi tnesses in on h is behalf nor confront wi tnesses 
brought by the S t a t e , to which p e t i t i o n e r said "yes" (R. 9 6 ) . 
F ina l l y , the Judge asked p e t i t i o n e r i f he was under the inf luence 
of drugs t o which p e t i t i o n e r responded "yes" and the Judge 
c l a r i f i e d p e t i t i o n e r was taking prescr ipt ion medication due t o a 
car accident (R. 97) • 
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Pet i t ioner appeared again before Judge Palmer on 
December 22 , 1983 for sentencing. At t h i s time, pe t i t i oner made 
a motion t o withdraw his g u i l t y plea on the ground that he was 
under the inf luence of medication a t the time he entered h is plea 
and did not understand the proceedings. Judge Palmer took the 
matter under advisement unt i l January 12 , 1984 (R. 103-107) . 
On January 12 , 1984, pe t i t i oner appeared before Judge 
Palmer for sentencing, a t which time p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion t o 
withdraw h i s gu i l t y plea was denied (R. 9 9 ) . Pe t i t ioner 
requested Judge Palmer continue the matter unt i l January 19, 
1984, to give p e t i t i o n e e s probation o f f i c er s u f f i c i e n t time to 
present a pre-sentence report t o the judge (R. 99-101) . 
On January 19 , 1984, pe t i t i oner appeared before Judge 
Palmer for sentencing. Pe t i t i oner made a motion that another 
probation or parole o f f i cer be assigned t o make a recommendation. 
The motion was granted and sentencing was continued u n t i l 
February 9 , 1984 (R. 86 -92 ) . 
On February 9 , 1984, pe t i t i oner appeared before Judge 
Palmer for the f ina l time for sentencing. Pe t i t ioner was 
sentenced t o zero t o f i v e years in the Utah State Prison (R. 108-
112) . 
Pe t i t ioner neglected t o f i l e an appeal from the denial 
of h i s motion to withdraw his g u i l t y plea but instead sought a 
wri t of habeas corpus before the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, 
Third D i s t r i c t Court in and for the Sa l t Lake County, State of 
Utah, on December 18, 1984 (R. 2 - 4 ) . Judge Russon made the 
fo l lowing conclusions of law: f i r s t , pe t i t ioner entered his plea 
- 3 -
i n t e l l i g e n t l y and v o l u n t a r i l y , second, a motion t o withdraw a 
g u i l t y plea i s l e f t t o the t r i a l court ' s d i s c r e t i o n , t h i r d , 
reviewing courts grant considerable l a t i t u d e to t r i a l judges' 
d i s c r e t i o n , and fourth, Judge Palmer did not abuse his d i s c r e t i o n 
(Addendum A). Judge Russon then denied the p e t i t i o n for a writ 
of habeas corpus (R. 182) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pet i t ioner may not use a post convict ion remedy, Rule 
65B(i) as a s u b s t i t u t e for a d i r e c t appeal. Judge Russon 
properly denied p e t i t i o n e r ' s p e t i t i o n for habeas corpus r e l i e f in 
that he properly found no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n in the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s dec i s ion not to grant p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion t o withdraw his 
g u i l t y p lea . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT J 
PETITIONER MAY NOT USE THE POST 
CONVICTION REMEDY PROVIDED BY RULE 
6 5 B ( i ) AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A DIRECT 
APPEAL. 
Pet i t ioner had an opportunity t o ra ise on d irect appeal 
the i s s u e s he now r a i s e s but f a i l e d to do so. By ra i s ing these 
i s s u e s now, pe t i t i oner attempts t o circumvent the normal 
appel la te process. 
I t i s we l l e s tab l i shed that the pos t - conv ic t ion remedy 
provided by Rule 65B( i ) , Utah Rules of C iv i l Procedure, may not 
be u t i l i z e d as a "subst i tute for or cannot be used t o perform the 
funct ion of regular appe l la te review." Codianna v. Morris f 660 
P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983); ajC££JLd# Andrews v. Morris. 607 P.2d 
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816 (Utah 1980); Rammell v. Smith. 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) . 
Consequently, a pe t i t ioner cannot ra i s e i s s u e s in a post 
convic t ion proceeding that could or should have been raised on 
d i r e c t appeal, except in unusual circumstances. Codianna v. 
HQixLSf 600 P.2d 1101, £££ jaJLSQ Brown v. Turnery 21 Utah 2d 96, 
440 P.2d 968 (1968). 
Just recent ly the United S ta tes Supreme Court held that 
a pe t i t i oner must show cause for a procedural default and 
prejudice a t t r ibutab le thereto in order to obtain review of h i s 
defaulted cons t i tu t iona l claim. Murray v. Carrier, 39 Crim. L. 
Rep. 3218 (U.S. June 26, 1986) (No. 84-1554) c i t i n g Wainwright v. 
JSyJtfiJSr 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The doctrine of procedural defaul t i s 
appl icable to s t a t e habeas corpus proceedings. Murray v. 
Carrier, 39 Crim. L. Rep. a t 3221. 
Pet i t ioner had the opportunity to ra ise the i s s u e s in 
his p e t i t i o n on d i rec t appeal but chose not to pursue the normal 
procedure of appel late review. Pet i t ioner provides no excuse for 
h is procedural defaul t and thus, the instant p e t i t i o n should be 
dismissed. 
The writ of habeas corpus i s an extreme remedy and i s 
not intended as a s u b s t i t u t e for appe l la te review. Obviously, 
p e t i t i o n e r should not be allowed t o circumvent the normal 
procedure and e x p l o i t the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus 
as provided by Rule 6 5 B ( i ) , Utah Rules of Civ i l Procedure, in 
order to sandbag claims which should have been raised on d irec t 
appeal. In l i g h t of the c l ear ly enumerated r e s t r i c t i o n s on the 
u t i l i z a t i o n of habeas corpus, p e t i t i o n e e s claims are not 
cognizable by t h i s Court. 
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The types of unusual errors which are properly 
cognizable by habeas corpus have been narrowly limited to the 
following situations: (1) when the trial court had no 
jurisdiction over the person or the offense; (2) where the 
requirements of law have been so disregarded that the party is 
substantially and effectively denied due process of law; or (3) 
where some such fact is shown that it would be wholly 
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction. Brown v. 
TMUO&Xi 21 Utah 2d 98-99, 440 P.2d 969 (1968). The Court further 
stated in £JLQKH: 
If the contention of error is something which 
is known or should be known to the party at 
the time the judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within the time 
permitted by regular prescribed procedure, or 
the judgment becomes final and is not subject 
to further attack, except in some unusual 
circumstances • . . . Were it otherwise, the 
regular rules of procedure governing appeals 
and the limitations of time specified therein 
would be rendered impotent. 
440 P.2d at 969. 
P e t i t i o n e r has f a i l e d t o demonstrate t h a t h i s c l a i m s 
f a l l w i t h i n the "unusual c i r c u m s t a n c e s " e x c e p t i o n t o t h e r u l e s 
governing habeas corpus r e l i e f in Utah. In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , a l l 
of p e t i t i o n e r ' s c l a i m s could have been r a i s e d on d i r e c t a p p e a l . 
T h e r e f o r e , p e t i t i o n e r ' s procedural d e f a u l t should not be 
o v e r l o o k e d , and h i s appeal should be d i s m i s s e d . 
POINT II 
JUDGE RUSSON PROPERLY DENIED PETITIONER'S 
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF IN 
THAT HE PROPERLY FOUND NO ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION IN THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
NOT TO GRANT PETITIONER'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
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Pet i t ioner a l l e g e s in t h i s appeal that Judge Russon 
erred in denying habeas corpus r e l i e f . He claims that the record 
below es tab l i shed that Judge Duffy Palmer abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n 
in refusing to grant p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion to s e t as ide his gu i l t y 
plea . S p e c i f i c a l l y r he claims that the record e s t a b l i s h e s that 
h i s g u i l t y plea was involuntary and u n i n t e l l i g e n t because: (1) 
Judge Palmer f a i l e d t o s t r i c t l y adhere to the procedures out l ined 
in Utah R. Crira P. 1 1 ( e ) , Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11(e) (Supp. 
1983)
 r and in Boykin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238 (1969) for the 
taking of g u i l t y p leas ; (2) he was under the influence of 
medication t o a degree as t o render him unable to comprehend the 
proceedings when his g u i l t y plea was entered. He separately 
claims (for the f i r s t time on t h i s appeal from the denial of 
habeas corpus r e l i e f ) that the State did not l i v e up t o the terms 
of the plea bargain arrangement a t the time of the sentenc ing . 1 
There are various review standards to consider in 
addressing p e t i t i o n e r ' s c laims. The f i r s t considerat ion i s the 
standard of review in a habeas corpus proceeding. 
In a habeas corpus proceeding, t h i s Court must 
determine whether there was a c lear substant ia l denial of 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s cons t i tu t iona l r i g h t s . Utah R. Civ. P. 6 5 B ( i ) . The 
burden i s on the pe t i t i oner to convince the t r i a l court that he 
1 This i s sue was never raised on direct appeal after p e t i t i o n e r ' s 
entry of his g u i l t y plea nor in h i s habeas corpus p e t i t i o n at the 
habeas corpus proceeding below. He r a i s e s i t for the f i r s t time 
on t h i s appeal. Thusf t h i s court should dec l ine t o address i t . 
£££ Jaramil lo v . Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19 f 465 P.2d 343 (1970) , 
^^^L-JL^JSmlt-br 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985)
 r si EMll3^y^^£aixl£lr 
39 Crira. L. Rep. 3218 (U.S. June 26, 1986) (No. 84-1554) . £&£ 
al£Q d i scuss ion in Point I , supra. 
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i s unlawfully restrained of h i s l i b e r t y or that there was a c lear 
substant ia l denial of h is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ights , Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B( i ) r Home v . Turner, 29 Utah 2d 175, 506 P.2d 1268 (1973) , 
Hanks v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 300, 508 P.2d 815 (1973). The 
pe t i t i oner has the burden of proving the grounds upon which he 
r e l i e s for h i s re lease by evidence which i s c lear and convincing. 
McGuffey v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967). 
The second standard of review to consider i s the 
standard of review of a defendant's motion t o withdraw his g u i l t y 
p lea . A criminal defendant may not withdraw a g u i l t y plea as a 
matter of r ight . State v . Plum. 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 
(1963); State v. Harris , 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978) . A motion to 
withdraw a g u i l t y plea i s addressed t o the t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
d i s c r e t i o n . State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977); 
State v . Garf ie ld . 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976) . As in a l l 
d i scret ionary matters due t o the t r i a l judge's prerogat ives , as 
wel l as h i s advantaged p o s i t i o n , reviewing courts accord 
considerable l a t i t u d e t o the t r i a l judge's prerogat ives , as wel l 
as h i s advantaged p o s i t i o n , reviewing courts accord considerable 
l a t i t u d e t o the t r i a l judge's d i s c r e t i o n and w i l l not i n t e r f e r e 
"unless i t p la in ly appears that there was an abuse thereof ," 
(Footnote omitted) Forsyth, 560 P.2d a t 339. 
In the ins tant case i f the p e t i t i o n e r e s tab l i shed by 
c lear and convincing evidence that h i s plea was involuntary and 
u n i n t e l l i g e n t then there would have been an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n 
in the t r i a l court ' s denial of p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion t o withdraw 
h i s g u i l t y p lea . However, p e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h h i s 
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plea was involuntary or u n i n t e l l i g e n t before e i ther Judge Palmer 
or Judge Russon. 
in Boykin Y, Alabamar 395 U.S. 238 (1969) , the United 
S ta te s Supreme Court held that i t was revers ib l e error for a 
t r i a l court to accept a g u i l t y plea without an aff irmative 
showing in the record that i t was made i n t e l l i g e n t l y and 
v o l u n t a r i l y . In Boykin, the pe t i t i oner plead g u i l t y to f i v e 
indictments charging common law robbery and was sentenced t o 
death. The judge asked HQ guest ions of the pe t i t i oner concerning 
h is plea , and the pe t i t i oner did not address the court. The 
Court s ta ted: 
Several federal cons t i tu t iona l r ights are 
involved in a waiver that takes place when a 
plea of gu i l t y i s entered in a s t a t e criminal 
t r i a l . F i r s t , i s the pr iv i l ege of s e l f -
incrimination guaranteed by the Fi f th 
Amendment and appl icable t o the s t a t e s by 
reason of the Fourteenth. . . . Second, i s 
the right t o t r i a l by jury. . . . Third, i s 
the r ight to confront one's own accusers . 
We cannot presume a waiver of these from a 
s i l e n t record ( c i t a t i o n s omit ted) . 
Xd. a t 244. As a re su l t of Boykin, minimum requirements were 
e s tab l i shed which a court must meet when the pe t i t i oner makes a 
g u i l t y plea. 
The United S t a t e s Supreme Court, in two dec i s ions 
subsequent to Boykin, further c l a r i f i e d the re la t ionsh ip between 
a knowingly and vo luntar i ly entered plea and the defendant's 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . In Brady v. United S t a t e s , 397 U.S. 742 
(1970) , and North Carolina v . Alford. 400 U.S. 25 (1970) , the 
Court, c i t i n g poykin, upheld g u i l t y p leas as vo luntar i ly and 
i n t e l l i g e n t l y made without any indicat ion that s p e c i f i c a t i o n of 
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the Boykin t r i l o g y of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r ight s was required t o be 
made at the time of the acceptance of the p l e a s . In c l a r i f y i n g 
BoykinF the Court s ta ted: 
IT]he element added in poykin was the 
requirement that the record must 
af f irmat ive ly d i s c l o s e that a defendant 
who pleaded g u i l t y entered h i s plea 
understandingly and v o l u n t a r i l y . 
ILLadyr 3 9 7 u « s * a t 747-48, fn. 4 . The BJ^dy court looked t o the 
i s sue of vo luntar iness and i n t e l l i g e n c e of the person taking the 
plea without ty ing i t s a n a l y s i s t o the s t r i c t u r e s of the Boykin 
l i t a n y . The Court considered a l l relevant circumstances 
surrounding the g u i l t y plea in order to determine i t s 
vo luntar ines s . Likewise, in florth Carolina v. AlfordP 400 U.S. 25 
(1970) , the determination of whether a plea was made vo luntar i ly 
and i n t e l l i g e n t l y did not res t upon the structured quest ions of 
the Boykin l i t a n y , but rather upon the determination of "whether 
the plea represents a voluntary and i n t e l l i g e n t choice among the 
a l t e r n a t i v e courses of ac t ion open t o the defendant." Alf ord. 400 
U.S. a t 3 1 . 
In addition to the minimum requirements enumerated in 
Boykin, criminal pleas in Utah are also governed by statute. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e), Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11(e) (Supp. 
1983), provides requirements beyond the constitutional minimum: 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest and shall not accept 
such a plea until the court has made the 
findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
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(2) That the plea i s vo luntar i ly made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has 
r ights against compulsory se l f - incr iminat ion 
t o a jury t r i a l and to confront and c r o s s -
examine in open court the wi tnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea he waives 
a l l of those r i g h t s ; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature of the elements of the offense t o 
which he i s entering the plea; that upon 
t r i a l the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and that the plea i s an 
admission of a l l those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence that may be 
imposed upon him for each offense t o which 
plea i s entered, including the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences , and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea i s a 
r e s u l t of a prior plea d i scuss ion and plea 
agreement and i f so , what agreement has been 
reached. If i t appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed t o 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea 
to a l e s s e r included of fense , or the 
dismissal of other charges, the same shal l be 
approved by the court. If recommendations as 
to sentence are allowed by the court, the 
court shal l advise the defendant personally 
that any recommendation as to sentence i s not 
binding on the court . 
Pet i t ioner contends he did not enter h i s plea knowingly 
and voluntary because the t r i a l court did not comply with Utah R. 
Crim. P. 1 1 ( e ) . This Court has recent ly decided three cases which 
pertain s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h i s i s s u e , State v. Mi l l er , 718 P.2d 403 
(Utah 1986) , Warner v. Morris. 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985) and i t s 
companion case Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985) . In 
IdALDSil and Brooks, just l i k e the case at hand, the t r i a l court 
f a i l e d t o ask s p e c i f i c a l l y i f "pet i t ioner was aware that he had a 
r ight against compulsory s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n . " Warner. 709 P.2d at 
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310. Despite the t r i a l court1s fai lure to address th i s issue this 
Court stated "that the record as a whole affirmatively establishes 
that petitioner entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of i t s consequences. . . . " i d . a t 310. 
In Miller, the petitioner argued the t r i a l court abused 
i t s discretion by refusing to a l io / him to withdraw his guilty 
plea since he did not understand the nature of the charges against 
him or the consequences of his plea. This Court found that 
although the t r i a l court did not make a specific finding to th i s 
effect, "the absence of a finding under th is section i s not 
c r i t i ca l so long as the record as a whole affirmatively 
establishes that the defendant entered his plea with ful l 
knowledge and understanding of i t s consequences and of the rights 
he was waiving" Miller 718 P.2d at 405. 
HjJJLer, Mainex and fij&aks are indicative that a t r i a l 
court accepting a guilty plea i s not required to do all that Rule 
11(e) l i s t s . Constitutionally/ a l l that i s required i s that the 
overall record discloses the defendant voluntarily and 
inte l l igent ly entered his guilty plea. 
In addition, other courts have differed as to how 
s t r i c t l y the Boykin standard must be followed in guilty plea 
proceedings. A majority of courts have held that as a matter of 
constitutional due process a defendant's constitutional rights to 
a jury t r i a l , confrontation, and protection against self-
incrimination need not be specifically and expressly art iculated 
by the t r i a l judge and expressly waived by the accused prior to 
the acceptance of the guilty plea. See e .g . . Rouse v. Foster. 672 
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F.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Neely v. Duckworth. 473 F.2d 288, 
(N.D. Ind. 1979); Wilkins v. Erickson. 505 P.2d 761 (9th Cir. 
1974); St inson V. Turnerr 473 F.2d 913, 915-16 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Michesney v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101, 1106-10 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Wood v , Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 501, , 554 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1976); 
Sate V. Laurino, 106 Ariz . 586, , 480 P.2d 342, 344 (1971). 
The cons t i tu t iona l requirements of Rule 11(e) and 
poykin were met in the instant case as shown by a review of the 
record. At the December 1 , 1983 g u i l t y plea proceeding the court 
read the Information (Addendum B) to pe t i t i oner and pe t i t ioner 
af f irmat ive ly s tated with no equivocation that he understood the 
charged offense (R. 94 , 95) . The court then asked pe t i t ioner 
whether he understood the g u i l t y plea agreement he entered i n t o 
with the prosecutor. Pet i t ioner requested of the court t o explain 
what type of j o i n t recommendation would be made on h i s behalf with 
respect t o the sentence (R. 94 , 95) . Pet i t ioner then indicated he 
understood which offense he would be pleading gu i l t y to and a l so 
s tated that he understood what type of concurrent motion would be 
made by both the prosecutor and the defense counsel at the time of 
sentencing (R. 95, 96) . 
Pet i t ioner then entered h i s gu i l t y plea and answered 
af f irmat ive ly when asked by the court whether he was in fact 
g u i l t y (R. 9 5 ) . Judge Palmer then asked p e t i t i o n e r whether he 
understood, as a re su l t of pleading g u i l t y , that such a crime 
carried a prescribed penalty , and that because pe t i t i oner chose to 
plead g u i l t y he was waiving h i s r ights to be t r i ed by a jury, to 
c a l l wi tnesses t o t e s t i f y on h i s behalf and t o confront the 
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prosecutor' s w i tnesses (R. 9 6 ) . Again, pe t i t i oner indicated that 
he understood the consequences of h i s plea (R. 96) . The court 
then asked p e t i t i o n e r whether he was under medication a t that time 
(R. 96) . The Court then c l a r i f i e d that p e t i t i o n e r was taking 
prescr ip t ion medication as a r e s u l t of a previous automobile 
accident (R. 96, 97 ) . The court then found that pe t i t i oner 
understood the nature of h i s plea andf therefore , p e t i t i o n e r ' s 
plea was vo luntar i ly and i n t e l l i g e n t l y entered (R. 97) . 
I t i s c lear from the record f in the ins tant case , that 
pe t i t i oner entered his g u i l t y plea i n t e l l i g e n t l y and v o l u n t a r i l y , 
in accordance with Boykin. and Utah R. Crim. P. 1 1 ( e ) . When asked 
i f p e t i t i o n e r heard the information and understood i t pe t i t i oner 
answered in the aff irmative (R. 9 4 - 9 5 ) . Pe t i t ioner s tated he was 
pleading g u i l t y because he was in fact g u i l t y (R. 96) . The t r i a l 
court informed p e t i t i o n e r that by pleading g u i l t y he was waiving 
h i s right to be t r i ed by a jury, t o c a l l w i tnesses t o t e s t i f y on 
h i s behalf and t o confront the prosecution1 s w i tnes ses (R. 9 6 ) . 
The t r i a l court did not err in accepting p e t i t i o n e r ' s o r i g i n a l 
p lea; there fore , p e t i t i o n e r ' s f i r s t two c la ims, that the t r i a l 
court v i o l a t e d Rule 11 and because of the v i o l a t i o n of Rule 11 
p e t i t i o n e r should be able to withdraw his g u i l t y p lea , are without 
merit . 
The p e t i t i o n e r further a l l e g e s the t r i a l court erred in 
denying h i s motion t o withdraw his g u i l t y plea because pe t i t i oner 
was under the influence of drugs a t the time he entered h i s gu i l t y 
p lea . 
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On December 22 , 1983, pe t i t i oner moved t o withdraw his 
g u i l t y p lea . The court reminded pe t i t ioner that he had been asked 
at h i s g u i l t y plea proceeding i f he was under the influence of any 
medication, alcohol or drugs (R. 103) . Although pe t i t i oner 
answered yes t o the above quest ion (R. 103) the court c l a r i f i e d 
that p e t i t i o n e r was taking prescribed medication for a car 
accident (R. 1 0 3 ) . The court then pointed out t o pe t i t i oner that 
he had been asked at his g u i l t y plea proceeding i f he understood 
h i s gu i l t y p lea , and i f he was pleading g u i l t y because he was 
g u i l t y # and pe t i t i oner had responded in the aff irmative (R. 103) . 
I t was a l s o pointed out that pe t i t i oner had been asked i f he 
understood that by pleading gu i l ty he was giving up cer ta in 
r i g h t s , including the r ight to t r i a l by jury, and the r ight to 
confront the S t a t e ' s wi tnesses (R. 104) . 
Although at the time of the plea , pe t i t i oner s tated t o 
the judge that he was under the influence of prescribed drugs, 
there i s nothing in the record t o support p e t i t i o n e r ' s a s s e r t i o n 
that these prescribed drugs af fected him in such a way as to make 
the entry of h i s gu i l t y plea u n i n t e l l i g e n t and involuntary. 
Pet i t ioner s tated t o the court he did not understand what would 
happen a t the time of sentencing and asked the court to explain 
the procedure to him (R. 95) . The fac t that pe t i t ioner asked 
quest ions i s evidence the pe t i t i oner was coherent and f u l l y 
understood what was happening during his g u i l t y p lea . 
P e t i t i o n e r ' s physic ian, Dr. Brewer, did not think p e t i t i o n e r was 
adversely affected by the prescr ipt ion drugs. Dr. Brewer met with 
pe t i t i oner on f i v e d i f f erent occasions and made progress notes 
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concerning the p e t i t i o n e r . Nothing e x i s t s in those notes t o 
indicate a drug problem or that p e t i t i o n e r was under the influence 
of drugs during those meetings (Exhibit 4-P, Addendum A pages 3 
and 4 ) • 
Moreover, p e t i t i o n e r was represented by competent 
counsel , which means that "when a pe t i t i oner enters a plea of 
g u i l t y upon the advise of a competent at torney, the plea i s deemed 
to be i n t e l l i g e n t l y entered." Guglielmette v. TurnerP 496 P.2d 
261, 262 (Utah 1972) . .&&£ SLLSQ, Moxley v. MorrisP 655 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982) . Mr. Holt, p e t i t i o n e r ' s attorney a t the arraignment, 
t o l d the court, in no uncertain terms, that "we have a plea 
negot ia t ion that he [the p e t i t i o n e r ] i s w i l l i n g t o accept a t t h i s 
t ime," (R. 9 5 ) . Further, p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel t e s t i f i e d a t the 
habeas corpus hearing that there was nothing t o ind icate that 
p e t i t i o n e r was confused or did not understand the matter of the 
proceedings (R. 159, 162, 173-175) . 
The overal l record e s t a b l i s h e s p e t i t i o n e r v o l u n t a r i l y 
and i n t e l l i g e n t l y entered his g u i l t y plea and Judge Palmer did not 
err in denying p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p lea . 
F ina l ly , pe t i t i oner contends the State f a i l e d to comply 
with the agreement of the plea bargain by not jo in ing a 402 
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motion, 2 which would have allowed petitioner to have his guilty 
plea set aside. Petitioner failed to raise this issue at trial. 
This court should not consider an issue raised for the first time 
on appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding. Jaramello v. Turnery 24 
Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 343 (1970). ££ Murray v. Carrier. 39 Crim. 
L. Rep. 3218 (U.S. June 26, 1986) (No. 84-1554) citing Wainwright 
v. Sykes. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See discussion in Point I supra and 
in footnote 1 supra. Assuming the petitioner had raised this issue 
at the habeas corpus hearing this argument is without merit. 
A 402 motion is left to the Judge's discretion whether 
to grant or deny it. Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-402(2) (Supp. 1985). 
Judge Palmer made this point quite clear when he told 
the petitioner that "Ibloth defense counsel and the County 
Attorney's Office know that I never grant a 402 motion until you 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1985) provides: 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower category of offense. (1) If 
the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the 
history and character of the defendant, concludes that it would 
be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that 
category of offense established by statute and to sentence the 
defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, 
the court may, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, 
enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the conviction 
shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor if: 
(a) The judge designates the sentence to be for a 
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within the limits 
provided by law for a misdemeanor; or 
(b) The imposition of the sentence is stayed and the 
defendant is placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a 
condition of probation or not, and he is thereafter discharged 
without violating his probation. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude 
any person from obtaining or being granted an expungement of his 
record as provided by law. 
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prove yourse l f that you can behave yourse l f out on probation. I 
jus t plain don't grant that . . . I never have and as long as I'm 
on the bench I never w i l l and I don't think i t ' s r ight" (R. 9 0 ) . 
Pe t i t ioner a l l e g e s that the State f a i l e d in t h e i r 
agreement t o j o i n in a 40 2 motion and because of t h i s a l l e g e d 
f a i l u r e the p e t i t i o n e r was sentenced to a third degree fe lony . 
The agreement was that the S ta te would drop one other charge which 
i t did, and upon a condit ion concur in a 402 motion (R. 96) . 
There i s some dispute over the condit ion the S ta te placed on the 
p e t i t i o n e r in deciding whether or not t o j o i n the 402 motion. The 
State and the court b e l i e v e the condit ion was i f p e t i t i o n e r ' s 
record was e n t i r e l y c lean a t the time of sentencing (R. 95, 96, 
8 8 ) . The p e t i t i o n e r thought the condit ion was that h i s record had 
to be absent of other crimes involving the obtaining of 
prescr ip t ions (R. 9 0 ) . The record c l e a r l y shows that Judge 
Palmer, during the arraignment, explained to pe t i t i oner that h i s 
record had t o be e n t i r e l y c lean (R. 9 6 ) . 
While p e t i t i o n e r was on probation he committed another 
crime and thus Judge Palmer denied a 402 motion (R. 9 0 ) . Any 
error would be harmless s ince the authority to grant or deny a 
402 motion i s s o l e l y with the t r i a l court and further i t i s the 
court, not the prosecution, who imposes the sentence. This Court 
s ta ted in S ta te v. Harris , 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978): 
lUlpon convic t ion of a crime, whether by 
verdict or by p lea , the matter of the 
sentence to be imposed r e s t s e n t i r e l y 
wi th in the d i s c r e t i o n of the court , within 
the l i m i t s prescribed by law. It should 
be so p la in as t o hardly require express ion 
that where a defendant has knowingly and 
v o l u n t a r i l y entered a plea of g u i l t y , the 
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mere fact that he may have expected a l e s s e r 
sentence than that imposed, i s not a ground 
for permitting him to withdraw the plea . 
Harris , 585 P.2d a t 453. The pet i t ioner should not be allowed to 
withdraw h i s plea s ince the State dropped one charge as agreed and 
further s ince pet i t ioner committed a crime while on probation and 
thus the court had good reason t o deny the 402 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Because pe t i t i oner f a i l e d to f i l e a d irec t appeal t h i s 
Court i s precluded from granting h i s p e t i t i o n for pos t -convic t ion 
r e l i e f . The Judge at the habeas corpus hearing properly denied 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s p e t i t i o n for habeas corpus r e l i e f since the record as 
a whole e s t a b l i s h e s the pe t i t i oner vo luntar i ly and i n t e l l i g e n t l y 
entered h i s g u i l t y p lea . Respondent re spec t fu l l y requests t h i s 
court t o affirm the denial of the writ of habeas corpus. 
DATED t h i s / 7 day of Q v / , 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to 
Philip G. Jones, attorney for appellant, 930 South State Street, 
Suite 10, Orem, Utah 84058, this ^7 day of July, 1986. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ABE LEVI WELLS, 
Petitioner, 
-v-
KENNETH V. SHULSEN, Warden, Utah 
State Prison, STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF ADULT PROBATION 
AND PAROLE, 
Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSION OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
Civil No, C82-5273 
(Judge Russon) 
On December 18, 1984, in the above entitled Court, 
before the Honorable Leonard Russon, Judge, an evidentiary 
hearing was held to determine whether petitioner had 
involuntarily and unintelligently entered his guilty plea before 
Judge Palmer on December 1, 1983, and whether Judge Palmer abused 
his discretion in refusing to allow petitioner to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
Petitioner appeared with his counsel, J. Bruce Savage; 
J* Stephen Mikita, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf 
of respondents. Petitioner testified on his own behalf and 
respondents called Scott Holt, Esq. (petitioner's appointed trial 
counsel) to testify. Having heard and considered the testimony 
of these respective witnesses, the court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December lf 1983, petitioner was arraigned 
before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmerf Judge, in the Second 
Judicial District Court, Davis County, on the charge of obtaining 
a prescription drug under false pretenses. Petitioner appeared 
with his counsel, Scott W. Holt. 
2. A copy of the Information was delivered to 
petitioner, and read aloud by the court clerk. After petitioner 
was informed by the Court of his rights and after consulting with 
his attorney, petitioner entered a guilty plea to the charged 
offense. 
3. Petitioner appeared again before Judge Palmer on 
December 22, 1983 for sentencing. At this time, petitioner made 
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he was 
under the influence of medication at the time of entering his 
plea. Judge Palmer took the matter under advisement. 
4. On January 12, 1984, petitioner once again appeared 
before Judge Palmer for sentencing, at which time petitioner's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied. 
5. Judge Palmer continued sentencing until January 19, 
1984, to give petitioner's probation officer sufficient time to 
present a pre-sentence report to the judge. 
6. On January 19, 1984, petitioner appeared before 
Judge Palmer for sentencing. Petitioner made a motion that 
another probation or parole officer be assigned to make a 
recommendation. The motion was granted and the court ordered 
**jr* 
that a new probation officer be assigned to petitioner. 
Sentencing was then continued until February 9, 1984. 
7* On February 9, 1984, petitioner appeared before 
Judge Palmer for the final time for sentencing. For the offense 
of obtaining prescription drugs under false pretense, petitioner 
was sentenced to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. 
8. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in this Court claiming that he had entered his guilty plea 
involuntarily and unintelligently since he was under the 
influence of prescribed medication at the time that he entered 
his plea. 
9. Petitioner also contends that Judge Palmer abused 
his discretion in refusing to allow petitioner to withdraw his 
plea. 
10. On October 13, 1983, petitioner met with his 
physician, Dr. Brewer, and progress notes were made at that time 
by Dr. Brewer. There is nothing in that entry to indicate any 
addiction problems or that petitioner was under the influence. 
11. On November 14, 1983, petitioner again met with 
Dr. Brewer and there is nothing in that entry related to drugs or 
petitioner being under the influence. 
12. Other entries were made by Dr. Brewer on November 
5, 22, and December 16, 1983, and there is nothing to indicate a 
drug problem or petitioner being under the influence on those 
occasions. 
13. With regard to Exhibit 4-P, a letter written by 
Dr. Brewer to Judge Palmer on December 16, 1983, it is 
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significant that Dr. Brown did not warn Judge Palmer that 
petitioner was under the influence of narcotics and incapable of 
rational judgment. 
14. Mr. Holt, petitioner's appointed trial counsel, 
who observed petitioner over a given period, stated that there 
was nothing to indicate to him that petitioner was under the 
influence at the time that he plead guilty or that he was unable 
to give a free and knowledgeable reply to the court or to enter 
his plea intelligently, voluntarily, and knowingly. 
15. Also significant, is the fact that petitioner, 
during the guilty plea hearing, answered Judge Palmer's questions 
quite clearly, and on one occasion corrected the judge's 
pronunciation of his name. On another occasion, petitioner 
requested the judge to clarify a portion of the information which 
was read to him. 
16. All of this demonstrates that petitioner knew full 
well what was going on at the time he plead guilty. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A review of the evidence demonstrates clearly that 
petitioner entered his guilty plea intelligently and voluntarily. 
Boykin V. Alabama* 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Brady v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742 (1970); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 
(1970); Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11(e) (1983 Pocket Supplement). 
2. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to 
the trial courtfs discretion. State v. Forsyth. Utah, 560 P.2d 
337 (1972); State V, Garfield, Utah, 552 P.2d 129 (1976). 
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3 . As in a l l d i scret ionary matters, due to the t r i a l 
judge 1 s prerogat ives , as wel l as h i s advantaged p o s i t i o n , 
reviewing courts accord considerable l a t i t u d e to the t r i a l 
judge's d i s c r e t i o n and w i l l not in ter fere "unless i t p la in ly 
appears that there was an abuse thereof ." fftate v» Fo r sy th . 
Utah, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (1977) . 
4 . A review of the t ranscr ip t s demonstrates that Judge 
Palmer did not abuse h i s d i s c r e t i o n in denying p e t i t i o n e e s 
motion t o withdraw his g u i l t y p lea . 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the p e t i t i o n for a writ of 
habeas corpus i s denied. -
DATED t h i s J&ZL*day of J^^^lxX^^U^ . 1985. 
ATTEST " 
H. DIXON HIWDLEY / f
 L , jj 
n - n LEONARD RUSSON, ^Judgfc 
By Cx^TsPV.l r\gjx( W ThirH J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court 
' Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
postage prepaid, to J. Bruce Savage, Jr., Attorney for 
Petitioner, P.O. Box 2520, Park City, Utah 84060, and to Abe Levi 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF^UtfAM"" L'•-••'• 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT v: -— . M. . 
OR t..-w,.'..... .-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. V z SJJINFORMATION 
<* *" i ~ 0 ' w - w 
ABE L. WELLS, aka : 
DAVID MARTINEZ, aka OFFICE OF 
ABEL WELLS, ATTORNEY GENERAL1 
Defendant ! t No. i ) 
The undersigned# John Lybbert, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about the 5th 
day of November, 1983, at Davis North Medical Center, 1600 West 
Angelope, Layton, County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the 
crimes of: 
COUNT ONE 
OBTAINING A PRESCRIPTION UNDER FALSE PRETENSES (58-37-8(4)(a)(Ii) 
UCA), a felony, as follows: That at the time and place'aforesaid, 
the defendant did acquire or obtain possession of a controlled 
substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, 
subterfuge, or the use of a false name or address. 
COUNT TWO 
PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION TO POLICE OFFICER (76-8-507 UCA), a 
class C misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place 
aforesaid, the defendant did knowingly give a false name or 
a d d r e s s +c% A 1*I*I AnfVkr^^m^i-k* **ee<i~*<~ i «* A.U-> I ^ . - ^ . _ % • • 
his official duties, with the intent of misleading said law 
enforcement officer as to his identity. 





Terry L. Lemmon 
Dr. R. Wallin 
This offense carries a possible maximum penalty of up to five years 
in jail and/or up to $5,000 fine. 
